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Abstract
This paper argues that the epistemological promotion of mathematics by the Jesuit Cristoforo Borri, while he was teaching at
the Coimbra Jesuit College in the late 1620s, played a decisive role in the updating of cosmological ideas in 17th-century Portugal.
The paper focuses on Borri’s position on the celebrated quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum and on his understanding of
the classification of sciences. It argues that by conferring on mathematics the status of Aristotelian causal science, Borri made it
possible to integrate mathematical data into the philosophical debate, particularly with regard to the new cosmology.
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Sumário
Neste estudo defende-se a tese de que a promoção do estatuto epistemológico da matemática concretizada pelo jesuíta Cristoforo
Borri, enquanto professor de matemática no Colégio das Artes (Coimbra) no final da década de vinte do século XVII, teve um papel
decisivo na actualização das ideias cosmológicas no Portugal de Seiscentos. Este artigo tem como objecto a posição de Borri na
célebre quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum, bem como concepção deste matemático jesuíta no que respeita à classificação
das ciências. Neste estudo argumenta-se que Borri, ao conferir à matemática o estatuto de ciência causal aristotélica, permitiu a
inserção no debate filosófico e, particularmente no domínio cosmológico, de dados provenientes da reflexão matemática.
© 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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The Italian Jesuit Cristoforo Borri has long been considered by Portuguese historiography of science and culture as
having played a seminal role in revising cosmological teaching in 17th-century Portugal. W.G.L. Randles, acknowl-
edging Luís de Albuquerque’s standpoint, has claimed that “in Portugal, the new vision of the heavens was received
much more readily than in Spain, a fact explained by the stay in Portugal of a singular personality, Cristoforo Borri
(1583–1632) an Italian Jesuit of Milanese origin” [Randles, 1999, p. 174]. In the course of the mathematical and as-
tronomical lessons he gave at the Jesuit Colegio das Artes and Colégio de Santo Antão (in Lisbon), in the late 1620s,
Borri is mentioned as being the first to pay serious attention to Copernican and Tychonic cosmological systems in
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heavens, the fluid and corruptible nature of the heavens, and the celestial location of comets, decisively influencing
the cosmological thought of leading Portuguese philosophers, such as the Jesuits Baltazar Teles (1596–1675) and
Francisco Soares Lusitano (1605–1659).3
Recently there have been several articles on the diffusion of new astronomy among early 17th-century Jesuit math-
ematicians in Portugal that provide a somewhat different picture. News of Galileo’s astronomical observations and
the Galilean telescope, together with the exposition of Copernicus and Tycho Brahe’s systems, had been presented at
least as early as 1615–1616 by Giovanni Paolo Lembo (ca. 1570–1618), at that time professor of mathematics at the
Colégio de Santo Antão.4 A quite experienced observational astronomer and the builder of the first telescope of the
Collegio Romano (in the summer of 1610), Lembo during his stay in Portugal not only expounded on these “new”
cosmological systems, but also put forward a semi-Tychonic cosmological synthesis. Probably inspired by Martianus
Capella’s fifth-century arrangement of the planets, Lembo proposed that Venus and Mercury orbited the sun, while
the sun, together with the remaining planets, orbited the earth.5 Although Lembo himself did not discuss the doctrine
of fluid heavens, Johann Gall, according to Borri, had taught the theory previously in the early 1620s [Borri, 1951,
p. 145]. Thus, prior to Borri’s teaching, the Tychonic system was already the subject of lectures at the Jesuit college
in Lisbon, with this educational institution, as Ugo Baldini has pointed out, being the first among Jesuit colleges and
probably even within Catholic universities more generally where the theory of the fluidity of the heavens was taught
[Baldini, 2000b, p. 303]. From this standpoint, Borri’s role in the improvement of astronomical and cosmological
teaching in Portugal did not possess the primary importance usually ascribed to it. In fact, Borri would distinguish
himself simply as a contributor to the dissemination of Brahe’s cosmological conceptions.
The aim of this paper is to discuss Cristoforo Borri role in the diffusion of cosmological ideas such as those of Tycho
Brahe in Portugal. I will suggest that Borri was instrumental in introducing mainstream European cosmology into
Portugal not merely by teaching these subjects, but more particularly because of his conception of the epistemological
status of mathematics. While teaching mathematics at the Coimbra Jesuit College, Borri approached the celebrated
quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum, arguing for the scientific nature of mathematics in a strictly Aristotelian
fashion. From Borri’s perspective, mathematics was causal, demonstrative, and necessary knowledge that could be
placed alongside natural philosophy. Hence Borri promoted mathematics on the grounds of Aristotelian epistemology,
while challenging at the same time the traditional classification of sciences. Accepting this view, mathematicians were
able to discuss research fields that were traditionally recognized as belonging to the philosopher, such as cosmology.
Furthermore, they took part in such controversies as mathematicians, indeed as philosopher-mathematicians. While
delving into philosophical fields, they enhanced the debate with mathematical data and arguments. Borri’s Collecta
Astronomica ex Doctrina is a relevant example. Because he placed mathematics within the Aristotelian taxonomy of
sciences, Borri was successful in having new cosmological ideas accepted by his Jesuit philosopher colleagues. More
generally, Borri’s case attests to the importance of theoretical mathematical discussion within early 17th-century
Aristotelian philosophy.
1. Borri and mathematical practice in early 17th-century Portugal
Borri landed in Lisbon in 1624, after roughly 10 years of astounding experience as a missionary in East Asia
[Mercati, 1951, pp. 35–36]. In Portugal, he encountered a peculiar tradition of mathematical training focusing chiefly
on the needs of nautical science, in which foreign Jesuit mathematicians with more up-to-date information were to
1 A critique of Aristotelian cosmology had already been carried out in Portugal in Manuel Bocarro Frances’s Tratado dos Cometas que appare-
ceram em Novembro passado de 1618 (Lisbon, 1619).
2 See Albuquerque [1965, p. 140], Andrade [1944, pp. 74–75; 1945, p. 371], Carvalho [1944, pp. 412ff], Carvalho [1973, p. 254], Cunha
[1984, p. 185], Santos [1935, p. 195].
3 There is no comprehensive study of the cosmology of Cristoforo Borri. Notices on his cosmological ideas, other than in the references mentioned
above, can be found in Carolino [2003, pp. 260–271], Dollo [2003, pp. 228–231], Donahue [1981, pp. 236–238], Lattis [1994, pp. 208–213], Lerner
[1995, pp. 157–163; 1997, pp. 114–115], Lourenço [1998], Randles [1995, pp. 139–141; 1999, pp. 174–178], and Schofield [1981, pp. 187–188,
227–228].
4 Baldini [2000a, 2000b], Carolino [2000], and Leitão [2001]. Nevertheless, Baldini has mentioned that it is possible that some Tychonic theories,
such as the fluidity of the heavens, were already being taught on Jan Wremann’s private course in 1614–1615. See Baldini [2000a, p. 77].
5 Lembo proposed this semi-Tychonic planetary arrangement in Lembo [1615–1617, fol. 36v.].
L.M. Carolino / Historia Mathematica 34 (2007) 187–205 189play a crucial role. Ruling a vast empire, which spread out from the Atlantic islands to East Asia and from the immense
territories of South America to African coasts, the Portuguese crown was continuously confronted with a severe lack
of available human resources, as—for example—the Portuguese population only stood at 1 to 1.5 million in the
mid-16th century.6 Huge logistical problems related to managing such an empire made Portuguese authorities look
upon outsiders with specific scientific and technical skills as potential pieces in this complex political and economic
chessboard. At that time, Lisbon was emerging as a center that attracted different kinds of tradesmen as well as
religious people with scientific training. Through Pope Calistus III’s Inter Coetera bull (1456), alongside other papal
decisions, the Portuguese crown was given spiritual jurisdiction over lands situated south of Cape Bojador, Cape Non
(Cabo Não) in Guinea, and the south of India. Anyone wishing to go on to any main extra-European territories in
missionary work had necessarily to depart from Portugal. This was the case for Jesuit mathematicians engaged in
Asian missions, including Borri, who in April 1615 passed through Lisbon on his way to East Asia.
Benefiting from this situation and from the international Jesuit network of educational institutions, Portuguese
monarchs, who already held Jesuit educational policy in high regard,7 relied on the Society to lighten some of their
operational needs. Special attention was unsurprisingly paid to nautical teaching. From the mid-16th century, the
training of nautical personnel was the responsibility of the Cosmógrafo-Mor (Chief Cosmographer), who was ex-
pected to train new pilots in mathematics, give examinations for makers of nautical instruments and cartographers,
and administer the inspection of various nautical instruments, charts, and globes [Albuquerque, 1972b, pp. 252–254].
Probably because the Cosmógrafo-Mor system was not as productive as the maritime empire’s needs,8 in about 1590
a public course in mathematics was established at the Jesuit Colégio de Santo Antão, in Lisbon, most likely following
a demand by King Sebastião. Mostly devoted to nautical training, this public course, known as Aula da Esfera (“Class
on the Sphere”), largely covered cosmography, navigation, and construction and use of nautical and astronomical in-
struments, with these subjects being taught in Portuguese (and not in Latin, as was usually the case with the Jesuits).9
Nevertheless, during this period, the Aula da Esfera was entrusted especially to non-Portuguese Jesuits. Accordingly,
outstanding mathematicians, some of whom had trained at Clavius’s school, taught this class for a number of years, in-
cluding João Delgado (1590–1593, 1595–1599, and 1605–1608), Christoph Grienberger (1599–1602), Jan Wremann
(1614–1615), Giovanni Paolo Lembo (1615–1617), and Johann Chrysostomus Gall (1620–1627) [Baldini, 2000b,
pp. 282–287]. Borri was also to be one of these teachers in the late 1620s, after having established his mathematical
and nautical competence with his Jesuit counterparts.
Borri, who joined the Society of Jesus in 1601, studied at the Jesuit college of Milan, circa 1605, probably receiving
instruction in mathematics from the Italian teacher G.B. Biamino [Baldini, 2000b, p. 289]. Afterward, he taught
mathematics in Mondovi (1607–1610) and philosophy (and most likely mathematics as well) at the Jesuit College
of Brera (1611–1614) in Milan.10 During his time teaching in Milan, Borri was to be one of the first Jesuits to
defend Tycho Brahe’s cosmological system, together with theories inspired by Robert Bellarmine’s cosmological
work, such as the fluidity of the heavens and the tripartite division of the celestial region.11 According to Borri’s
6 My understanding of the context in which mathematics was promoted in early modern Portugal is indebted to Leitão [2003, esp. 229–236].
7 By the late 1550s, the Portuguese Crown had guaranteed the monopoly of university educational programs in natural philosophy to the Jesuits.
In 1555, King João III entrusted the Society of Jesus with the Colégio das Artes (College of Arts), assuring it jurisdictional autonomy with regard
to the University of Coimbra. Yet according to the medieval model, the Colégio das Artes was devoted to the philosophical preparation of students
aiming to ingress in the university higher faculties (theology, law, canon law, and medicine). This state of affairs continued well after the entrustment
of the Colégio das Artes to the Jesuits, the propedeutical role of this college being promulgated by the University of Coimbra statutes of 1559 and
1653. As far as the University of Évora is concerned, the university had its origin in a Jesuit public school created in 1553. In 1559, with both
royal and papal agreement, this college was raised to university status and became the first and only Jesuit university in the Portuguese Assistancy.
Four faculties composed the University of Évora: Humanities, Arts, Theology, and Cases of Conscience (Moral Theology). See Carvalho [1986,
pp. 281–330]. For more details on the history of the Colégio das Artes and the University of Évora, see respectively Brandão [1933] and Gomes
[1960].
8 There is evidence indeed of the severe shortage of pilots in the Carreira da Índia at the beginning of the 17th century [Albuquerque, 1972b,
p. 255].
9 On the Aula da Esfera see Albuquerque [1972a] and Baldini [2000b].
10 The most extensive biographical study of Borri is Santos [1951]. Important information on his life as a missionary in East Asia can be found in
Mercati [1951] and Surdich [1979]. See also Baldini [2000b, p. 287].
11 Borri [1612, fls. 19v.–27v., esp. 24–26]. On Borri’s precociousness in defending Tychonic cosmology, see Lattis [1994, pp. 208–210], Lerner
[1995, pp. 157–163], and Dollo [2003, pp. 228–231].
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to his precociousness in cosmological matters, Borri was removed from teaching by the General Claudio Acquaviva
at the request of old-fashioned Jesuit fathers from the Milan province. Borri, as he himself stated, accepted this with
the proper patience and submission, only expressing that “time would prove that I was absolutely right on that issue
[fluidity and corruptibility of celestial matter] and that this theory would soon be universally embraced and followed
not only by mathematicians in their new observations and philosophers wishing to discard much of the superfluity
of non-necessary beings, but also by theologians with the purpose of reaching the concord of the Holy Scripture and
Holy Fathers.” He goes on by affirming that “everything happened just as I said, because immediately before leaving
for Asia, the neighbors in the Milan Province were seen to greatly admire this theory, as was the case with father
Giuseppe Biancani, at that time lecturer of mathematics in Parma, and father Raviccia, lecturer of philosophy in the
same college in Parma” [Borri, 1951, p. 143].
Borri’s immediate destination was East Asia, where his mathematical expertise played an important part in mis-
sionary work. He left Europe in April 1615, traveling first to Goa, where he stayed for 6 months, before departing for
Macao. In Macao, in the Colégio da Madre de Deus, he noted the persecution of Jesuits in 1617 by Chinese authori-
ties.13 He was then sent to Cocinchina, now Laos and Vietnam. According to Borri, the only two Jesuit missionaries
there were facing quite severe difficulties in their missionary work, even being forced to go into hiding, and thereby
requiring urgent help. The arrival of Borri in this missionary land seems to have been rather distressing. As he himself
narrated, he and a Portuguese Jesuit entered Cocinchina dressed as chaplain (the Portuguese Jesuit) and his servant
(Borri). While disembarking in the Cocinchina port of entry, Borri and his colleague were immediately identified as
missionaries, as a result of a bitter fight between two Portuguese men who happened to be present in which Borri de-
cided to intercede at a rather untimely moment. At the exact same time, a much-awaited downpour fortunately began,
so the two Jesuits could escape unnoticed.14
During his stay in East Asia, astronomy was never far away, and even played a role in his missionary work. Just
after arriving in Macao, Borri was surprisingly ordered by his superiors to write a paper on the fluidity of the celestial
heavens. According to Borri, Jesuits were experiencing difficulties in being accepted in East Asia because of their
Aristotelian–Ptolemaic cosmology, and especially because of the traditional division of the 11 hard heavens they
defended; so it was important to promote a new cosmology among Jesuit missionaries in East Asia [Borri, 1951,
pp. 143–144]. There is no evidence that Borri effectively took this task to hand. Nevertheless, once in Cocinchina, he
no doubt carried out astronomical observations, such as those of the comets of 1618,15 and of a number of eclipses.
Borri’s knowledge and ability to predict the occurrence of eclipses even brought him fame and respect among the king
and noblemen of Cocinchina, playing a part (he argues) in several conversions he carried out.16
Nonetheless, Borri found Cocinchina weather quite hard, spending long periods sick, and by 1622 he was on his
way back to Europe [Borri, 1979, pp. 106 and 118]. Based on his experiences in Cocinchina, he wrote Relatione della
nuova missione delli PP. della Compagnia di Giesù al regno della Cocincina, which was published in Rome in 1631.
This work was soon translated into French, Latin, English, Dutch, and German.17
On his way home to Europe, in Goa, sometime in 1623, the Jesuit missionary met Pietro della Valle, with whom he
discussed his cosmological ideas. At the suggestion of this notable and learned traveler, Borri wrote De Nova Mundi
Constitutione juxta Systema Tychonis Brahe aliorumque recentiorum mathematicorum, a work which was translated
into Persian by Pietro della Valle, spreading Tychonic cosmology from Persia to Armenia.18 In addition to their interest
in cosmology, Borri and Pietro della Valle’s conversations also focused on the problem of calculating longitude, a very
pressing question at that time. As Pietro della Valle noted in his letters,19 Borri was engaged in nautical studies, trying
12 This letter was published as an appendix to Santos [1951, at pp. 143–150]. In this paper, this document appears as Borri [1951].
13 Borri reported his missionary experience in East Asia in the manuscript “Relatione d’alcune cose di edificatione occorse al P. Christoforo Borri
della Compagnia di Giesù nell’India Orientale, massime in Cochinchina.” This text written in Coimbra, in 1627, formed the basis of a printed book
with a similar title, which was widely disseminated in 17th-century Europe. The manuscript, which has the advantage of having more personal
details than the printed version, was published in Surdich [1979, pp. 79–122]. Henceforth, quoted as Borri [1979].
14 These events are described in Borri [1979, pp. 79–81].
15 He mentioned this in Borri [1631, p. 117 (p. 115)].
16 These events are reported in Borri [1979, pp. 98–106].
17 See footnote 13.
18 This translation is now preserved in the Vatican Apostolic library. See Mercati [1951, p. 31] and Santos [1951, p. 127].
19 These letters were partially published by Mercati [1951].
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using the declination of a magnetic needle [Mercati, 1951, pp. 29 and 37ff]. Borri would continue his nautical studies
later in Lisbon.
Finally, when he arrived in Europe, Borri resumed his career as a mathematics teacher. While resting in Lisbon,
he was offered the chair of mathematics at the Coimbra College. He would remain in Coimbra for one academic
year (1626/1627), coming again into Lisbon to read the Aula da Esfera at the Colégio de Santo Antão. Given Borri’s
previous nautical experience and research, he would doubtless have appeared as the ideal candidate to teach practical
mathematics and nautical science to prospective pilots and related personnel who attended Aula da Esfera lessons. In
addition to Bellarmine’s cosmological theories, such as the tripartite division of heavens, the fluidity and corruptibility
of celestial matter, and the Tychonic planetary system,20 Borri also taught mnemonics and nautical science. His
nautical expertise seems even to have caught the attention of King D. Filipe IV, in Madrid, who asked him to write a
treatise on nautical science [Borri, 1979, p. 122]. Sometime in 1630, Borri, for reasons which remain unclear, decided
to abandon the Iberian peninsula and return to Italy. In Rome, he left the Jesuits and died soon thereafter, in 1632.
2. Borri vs Couto on the Quaestio de Certitudine Mathematicarum
Among other possible reasons for Borri setting out for Rome, the need to obtain support for the publication of
his Collecta Astronomica ex Doctrina may have been foremost in his mind, as Randles has proposed [Randles, 1999,
p. 175]. Borri’s cosmological masterpiece was already finished in 1627, as he himself mentioned this work in the first
draft of Relatione d’alcune cose di edificatione occorse al P. Christoforo Borri della Compagnia di Giesù nell’India
Orientale, massime in Cochinchina.21 It was more than likely that he made use of this work when, at the request of
Father António Mascarenhas [Santos, 1951, p. 145], he lectured on cosmological issues in Coimbra, and doubtless,
one year later, while lecturing Aula da Esfera at the Colégio de Santo Antão.22 In these public sessions, Borri received
“the general approval of the whole [Coimbran] College, not only from the mathematicians, but also from the philoso-
phers and the theologians” [Borri, 1951, p. 145]. The Portuguese audience appreciated Borri’s ideas, except for one
influential philosopher. This was Sebastião do Couto (1567–1639), who was the leading opposition to the publication
of Collecta Astronomica ex Doctrina.23 The raison d’être for Couto’s attitude concerns the different views held by
these Jesuits on the epistemological status of mathematics. As Borri noticed, Couto, who had first agreed with Borri’s
cosmological ideas, strongly disapproved of the publication of his book, because, Borri says, “in my readings and in
the preamble to mathematics, I efficaciously refuted that which he had stated in his Logica Conimbricense, in which
he attempted to fallaciously demonstrate that mathematics is not science” [Borri, 1951, p. 146]. Thus, in a country
whose early modern mathematical tradition has been described as being mainly confined to nautical needs, a theoreti-
cal question emerged as a bone of contention, with important consequences at the cosmological level: the question of
the certainty of mathematics (quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum), a quite pressing issue for the time.24
Borri did indeed go against the celebrated Coimbran commentaries on Aristotelian dialectics, written under the
guidance of Couto.25 Furthermore, in keeping with the scholastic method of teaching based on an analysis of a
specific quaestio, presenting first the opposite position and then the teacher’s thesis (followed by the teacher’s response
20 Borri’s cosmological lecture notes for the Aula da Esfera are entitled Nova Astronomia na qual se refuta a antiga da multidão de 12 Ceos pondo
so três. Aereo, Cidereo e Impireo [Borri, 1628]. Domingos Maurício dos Santos mentioned that these notes were those of lectures at the University
of Coimbra [Santos, 1951, p. 130]. Nevertheless, the manuscript explicitly declares that Nova Astronomia. . . consisted of lectures at the Colégio
de Santo Antão by Borri [1628, fl. 153v.]. The fact that it was written in Portuguese rather than in Latin also clearly indicates its provenance from
the Aula da Esfera.
21 Borri [1979, p. 122]. See footnote 13.
22 In fact, Nova Astronomia. . . [Borri, 1628] is similar to Collecta Astronomica ex Doctrina.
23 The difficulty Borri felt in getting his cosmological masterpiece published was indeed the reason for addressing the valuable memorial-letter to
Vitelleschi (see footnote 12).
24 On the quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum in the 16th and 17th centuries, see Crombie [1977], De Pace [1993], Galluzzi [1973], Giacobbe
[1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1976, 1977], and Mancosu [1996, pp. 8–33]. See also Carugo [1983], Gatto [1994, pp. 17–88], Romano [1999, pp. 153–162],
and Wallace [1984, pp. 141–148].
25 Between 1592 and 1598, an extensive series of commentaries were published on Aristotle’s works by the Jesuit philosophers of the Colégio
das Artes (Coimbra). The volumes on Physics, De Caelo, Meteorology, Parva Naturalia, Nicomachean Ethics, Generatione et corruptione, and
De Anima seem to have been written under Manuel de Góis, the volume on Dialectics under Sebastião do Couto, and two other appendices to De
Anima were written under Baltazar Alvares and Cosme de Magalhães. For a general study of the Conimbricenses, see Gomes [1992].
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epistemological status of mathematics.26 In line with Piccolomini and his confrere Benito Pereira (1535–1610),27
Couto held that mathematics was not a proper science in the Aristotelian sense. His arguments were twofold. First, he
focused on the logical analysis of mathematical reasoning, to emphasize the dissimilarities between the approaches
of Euclidean mathematics and Aristotelian logic. Then, he called into question the ontological issue, stressing the
incapacity of mathematics to deal with substances.
For Couto, as was common with early 17th-century scholastics, scientific knowledge required acquaintance with
the causes on which known effects depended. This causal knowledge should be obtained by means of a scientific
syllogism that combined demonstration “of the fact” (demonstratio quia) with demonstration “of the reasoned fact”
(demonstratio propter quid), proceeding both from effect to proximate cause (quia) and from proximate cause to effect
(propter quid). Though based on Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics I.13, this kind of syllogism, called demonstratio potis-
sima, was put forward mainly by some Italian philosophers, one of them being Alessandro Piccolomini (1508–1578),
and was to became a leitmotiv in 16th- and 17th-century discussion on the scientific status of mathematics.28 In his
Commentarium de Certitudine Mathematicarum Disciplinarum of 1547, Piccolomini acknowledges that demonstra-
tiones potissimae should be based on primary and immediate premises (no need for further demonstration) consisting
of propositions used in sciences and especially of proper definitions of precise subjects [Piccolomini, 1547, fls. 84r.–
86r.]. Demonstrationes potissimae should also have as their middle term a definition of a property or a subject that
can be taken as the only and immediate cause of the effect demonstrated [Piccolomini, 1547, fls. 91v.–95r.].
It was against this epistemological background that Couto approached the quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum
and refused to grant scientific status to mathematics. According to him, “mathematical disciplines do not make use of
true and a priori causes in their demonstrations, and consequently, taken this way they are not defined as true sciences
by Aristotle” [Couto, 1607, col. 503]. After taking his readers back to the common understanding of what science is
in the Aristotelian sense, Couto proceeds with arguments from authority. His allusion to the Platonic notion of the
intermediary nature of mathematics is of special relevance. Proclus, inspired by Plato’s The Republic, had conceived
of mathematical entities as placed in an intermediate realm between the multitude of empirical objects and the world
of Ideas. Unlike the latter, mathematical entities are multiple, but they are not confused and changeable, as is the
case with empirical entities. Different ontological levels required diverse faculties of knowledge. Therefore, between
sensible perception and the highest intelligence attained by a being there is a faculty through which mathematical
essences are learned from the multiplicity of different mathematical entities to serve as the subject of comprehensive
human knowledge. Proclus named this faculty “imagination” and Piccolomini introduced this concept into the quaes-
tio de certitudine mathematicarum controversy as the “fantasy” faculty (phantasia).29 Continuing the arguments of
authority, Couto alluded to this Platonic understanding of phantasia, at the same time misrepresenting its underlying
conception of the intermediate status of mathematics. According to him, mathematicians are concerned with quanti-
26 Lesson notes on the preamble to mathematics given by Borri in lectures at the University of Coimbra, in 1626–1627, are preserved at the
Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa. They consist of handwritten lecture notes by the student Inácio Nunes and they cover a quaestio with the title Num
matematicae disciplinae verae scientiae nomen induant? This title is almost verbatim the title of the same quaestio in the Commentarii Collegii
Conimbricensis e Societatis Iesu in Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae. In fact, in the Coimbran Dialectics volume written under S. do
Couto, the quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum is discussed in an article with the title Num mathematicae disciplina vera scientia rationem
induant [Couto 1607, col. 500]. Borri’s mathematical lecture notes are preceded by a commentary on some Aristotelian libri naturales, the author
of which certainly was not Borri, as the content of the teaching is quite dissimilar from his ideas (more specifically, with regard to comets). The
entire title of the volume containing both the lectures is Compendium problematum, meteorum et paruorum naturalium et tractatus aliquot de
mathematica disciplina traditi a Patre Christophoro Brono e Societate Jesu. Ignatius Nunes. Note that, in Portugal, Borri adopted the surname
Brono (or Bruno) for the reason that Borri is regrettably similar to the Portuguese word for “donkey.” Borri’s treatise will be cited in this paper
as Tractatus de mathematica disciplina: Num matematicae disciplinae verae scientiae nomen induant? [1627, Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa,
FG. 2378]. Hereafter, Borri [1627].
27 Benito Pereira, an outstanding professor of philosophy, theology, and Sacred Scripture at the Jesuit Collegio Romano, took up the issue of the
scientific validity of mathematics in the De Communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis et affectionibus libri quindecim [Pereira, 1576]. On
Benito Pereira’s examination of the quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum, see especially Giacobbe [1977] and De Pace [1993, pp. 75–120].
Couto does not mention Pereira in his discussion of whether mathematics should be considered a science.
28 In fact, the tripartite understanding of syllogism was first proposed by Averroes in his prohemium to his comments on Aristotle’s Physics. On
Piccolomini’s positions on the scientific status of mathematics, see especially Giacobbe [1972a] and De Pace [1993, pp. 21–75].
29 On Proclus’s conception of the intermediate nature of mathematics and mathematical knowledge, see especially Charles [1967]. With regard to
Piccolomini’s lecture on Proclus’ conception, see De Pace [1993, pp. 61–75].
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ties and do not take into account mathematical essences. Thus, mathematics could not be seen as a science. “Science,
especially speculative science,” Couto asserts, “in order to demonstrate the properties of a subject through true causes,
ought to know their essences and principles; but mathematicians by no means know the nature and essence of quantity,
so they cannot make use of true causes” [Couto, 1607, col. 503].
As a result of this Aristotelian reading of the Platonic argument, Couto was in a position to argue that mathemat-
ics does not fit the features of Aristotelian logic: because of its ontological nature, mathematics does not draw its
demonstrations based on immediate and per se causes. To prove the point, Couto used Proposition I.1 from Euclid’s
Elements, which shows how to construct an equilateral triangle on a given finite straight line [Couto, 1607, col. 503].
Proposition I.1 reads as follows: Let AB be the given finite straight line (see Fig. 1). Describe two circles with radii
of equal length (= AB) taking A and B as their respective centers, i.e., the circle BCD with the center A and the
radius AB and the circle ACE with the center B and the radius BA. Let C be the point of intersection of the circles.
Connect C to A and C to B with straight lines. As point A is the center of circle CDB , AB is equal to AC. Similarly,
as B is the center of circle CAE, BC is equal to BA. ABC is therefore an equilateral triangle.
In Couto’s view, this proposition cannot be explained causally because the triangle does not have an essence that
determines its consequent properties. Indeed, in the Euclidean proposition, the construction of the equilateral triangle
could only be established using an extrinsic element (the circles), and not the intrinsic and prior cause of the property
that is intended to be demonstrated: the equality of the sides of the triangle ABC. Consequently, in Euclidean mathe-
matics, the middle term is not the proper, intrinsic, and immediate cause of the effect demonstrated. As mathematical
demonstrations are not causal, one has to conclude, from Couto’s viewpoint, that mathematics does not fit the defini-
tion of demonstratio potissima (though he does not mention this definition) and, accordingly, mathematics could not
be taken as a true science.
From the noncausal character of mathematical demonstration, Couto drew a second conclusion to show that math-
ematics is not scientific. Since mathematicians do not make use of true and a priori causes in their demonstrations,
they are unable to perceive the affections that spring from essences and, thereby to know the very essences of realities.
Mathematical abstraction considers quantity exclusively as an abstract concept, not relating it to the natural world. Be-
ing prior to nature, mathematical reasoning applied to the physical world was not in a position to establish knowledge
of physical qualities, but of mere quantitative accidents. It cannot aspire to attain the knowledge of essences that char-
acterizes science from an Aristotelian viewpoint. As Couto asserted, “Science does not leave out those effects which
fall under its abstraction and can lead to the absolute knowledge of its subject. Therefore, mathematics is not a science
as it doubtless does not consider the causes of its demonstrations, nor the nature and the principles of the subject,
because those transcend its abstraction and limits. One can state this clearly as mathematics takes quantity apart from
all subject and efficient principle, so that it cannot be known from these issues what is the real essence and what is the
accident” [Couto, 1607, col. 504]. Mathematics was deprived of the status of a science not only because of the logical
weakness of its demonstrations, but also because of its failure to achieve an ontological understanding of nature. For
that reason, Aristotelians such as Couto did not consider pure mathematics as a valuable tool when enquiring into the
natural world. He recognized that mathematics was the most evident and the most certain among all disciplines, but
this was exactly the cause of its ontological inferiority. Unlike the “sciences,” which focus on “sensible experience”
in order to attain a comprehensive understanding of their essences, mathematics deals only with subjects created by
the human mind. In other words, mathematical demonstrations appear quite certain with regard to the intellect’s ordo
cognoscendi, but offered no advantage with respect to the natural world’s ordo essendi.30
30 Couto [1607, col. 506] makes use of this standard distinction between ordo cognoscendi and ordo essendi.
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mathematician who concentrates on quantity as an abstract entity, the natural philosopher looks at quantity as part of a
natural being, so that he is capable of understanding its features as flowing from the properties of this being. Therefore,
he is in a position to draw scientific syllogisms [Couto, 1607, cols. 504–505]. In examining physical reality, the natural
philosopher thus looked at the true substance of that reality, while the mathematician confined his research to the mere
description of quantitative aspects of the same reality. Only natural philosophy could lead to a scientific understanding
of the world.
A quite different picture was presented by Borri when, during his mathematical lectures in Coimbra, he dealt
with the question of the certainty and the scientific nature of mathematics. On the question of whether mathematics
is a true science, Borri immediately responded affirmatively [Borri, 1627, fl. 54v.].31 According to him, never before
Alessandro Piccolomini had there been a philosopher who doubted the truth of mathematics. Piccolomini, whom Borri
held in poor regard, as he had distinguished himself mainly as a dramatist,32 was the first to adopt such a position
[Borri, 1627, fl. 52r.], followed only by the scripturalis Benito Pereira.33 As for the belief of some Coimbran Jesuits in
the nonscientific character of mathematics, Borri attributed it to the knowledge they seemed to have of Piccolonimi’s
and Pereira’s thesis. Thus, it would seem suitable to him, Borri mentions in the introduction to his mathematical
lectures, to deal with the epistemological nature of mathematics in his Coimbra lessons [Borri, 1627, fl. 52r.].
Borri’s discussion of the epistemology of mathematics was largely based upon Giuseppe Biancani’s (1566–1624)
De Mathematicarum Natura Dissertatio [Biancani, 1615].34 There, the Jesuit professor of mathematics at the Univer-
sity of Parma developed a conception of the objects of mathematics that would influence Borri. According to Biancani,
both the mathematician and the natural philosopher focus on quantities abstracted from sensible matter. But unlike the
latter, who considers quantity absolutely, the geometer and the arithmetician are concerned only with quantity insofar
as it is delimited (terminata). Thus, the geometer who deals with continuous quantity considers finite straight or curved
lines, figures resulting from delimited surfaces and solid figures, while the arithmetician who takes discrete quantity
into consideration is concerned with numbers as delimited quantities [Biancani, 1615, pp. 5–6]. Borri, acknowledging
Biancani’s point of view, emphasized that as mathematics considers delimited quantity, the mathematician demon-
strates the properties that derive exclusively from quantity insofar as it is delimited [Borri, 1627, fl. 53v.]. In Borri’s
words, “it is obvious that these properties which the mathematician takes into account derive from the proper quantity
insofar as it is delimited, such as equality, inequality, division, transfiguration, various demonstrations, commensura-
bility, incommensurability, construction of figures, etc.” [Borri, 1627, fls. 53v.–54r.]. Borri goes on to assert that these
qualities do not flow from the intrinsic nature of quantity, as those who refused to grant mathematics the status science
thought, but by adding delimitation to quantity, they flow from it by emanation.35
Mathematical entities ought thus to be considered as true beings. Unlike physical entities they were not supposed to
exist in bodies’ sensible matter, but to exist exclusively as real intelligible entities. They derive their properties from the
essence of subjects, which means that mathematical entities are better known by nature. Furthermore, having granted
mathematics ontological status, Borri proceeds by stating that mathematical demonstrations, and especially those re-
31 In fact, Borri was not the first mathematician to defend the scientificity of mathematics in an Aristotelian fashion in Portugal. In 1606, the
Jesuit João Delgado (1553–1612), a former student of Clavius, argued for the scientific character of pure mathematics while teaching mathematics
at the Colégio de Santo Antão. Delgado defended this thesis by arguing that the causes on which scientific knowledge must be established should
also include “causes with no physical motion and existence.” By so doing, Delgado moved the controversy on the quaestio de certitudine mathe-
maticarum away from the strictly physical plan and found room for sustaining the scientificity of mathematics. According to him, mathematical
sciences’ distinctiveness resides not only in being a true and evident knowledge, but also in making use of formal and material causes, as well as of
efficient and, in a certain way, of final causes. With respect to this unorthodox thesis concerning efficient and final causality, Delgado defended this
position by maintaining that the formal cause had an efficient character and that the perfection of mathematical beings was similar to the final cause.
Nevertheless, Delgado’s defense did not influence either Jesuit mathematicians or philosophers. The mathematical lecture notes of João Delgado
are preserved at the Biblioteca Pública Municipal do Porto (ms. 664) and at the Biblioteca da Academia de Ciências de Lisboa (ms. 491V). For
more details on Delgado’s position on the quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum, see Carolino [2006].
32 Piccolomini had indeed written several comedies and sonnets and translated classic literary works such as part of the Æneid and Ovid’s
Metamorphoses. On his scientific works, see Suter [1969].
33 Borri [1627, fl. 54v.]. Note that Borri ignored, for example, Pietro Catena, who believed in the nonscientific character of mathematics.
34 An English translation of Biancani’s treatise can be found as an appendix to Mancosu [1996, pp. 178–212]. On Biancani’s position on the
quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum, see especially Giacobbe [1976] and Mancosu [1996, pp. 15–19]. See also Galluzzi [1973] and Dear
[1988, pp. 67–72].
35 Borri [1627, fl. 54r.]. Borri’s account of the object of mathematics is indeed quite similar to Biancani’s [1615, p. 6].
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That is, mathematical demonstrations are established on essential definitions, which expound the nature of math-
ematical entities, rather than simply on a process of abstraction prior to nature, as Couto argued. For this reason,
mathematical sciences are also unique, as they proceed from what is better known to the human mind, as mathemat-
ical demonstration has as its starting point a definition, which is obviously known even before the properties of the
thing defined. In other words, mathematical demonstrations have all the requirements entitling them to be considered
as scientific demonstration in the Aristotelian sense, as they proceed both from what is better known to us and from
what is better known to nature [Borri, 1627, fl. 55v.].
In order to derive mathematical properties from their essences, mathematicians draw their demonstrations based
on formal and material causes. With Biancani’s argumentation in mind, Borri stated that mathematics does make
use of formal cause, because the middle term of the mathematical demonstration (and especially the geometrical
demonstration) is a definition of the property and has an immediate connection with the effect demonstrated. “In
mathematics,” Borri states, “true demonstration proceeds from formal cause. This can be proven because numerous
geometrical demonstrations use definitions of the subject or the property in order to prove their conclusions” [Borri,
1627, fl. 55v.]. Taking the example of the construction of a square, when one declares that a square is a geometric
figure consisting of a quadrilateral with equal sides that are positioned at four right angles, one explicates the essence
of the square, that is, a geometrical figure which has two essential features at the same time and in the same thing:
having four equal sides plus four right angles. These two different features are the proper and immediate cause of
the constructed figure of the square.36 Borri adds one more example to prove the case, Proposition I.1 from Euclid’s
Elements, which Couto (and others) had used in order to provide evidence of the noncausal character of mathematical
demonstration (see Fig. 1). According to Borri, opponents of the scientific character of mathematics erroneously
assume Proposition I.1 to be a theorem, rather than a problem. By so doing, they stated that in Euclidean mathematics
the middle term is an extrinsic cause of the demonstrated effect. In constructing an equilateral triangle on a finite
straight line AB , Borri explains, the geometer takes advantage of the two circles with radii of equal length, taking A
and B as the centers of the respective circles, not as an external element, but as the true subject of the thing which
is the question of the demonstration. Thus, a geometer resolving this problem proves the equality of the three lines
making up an equilateral triangle by the proper definition of a circle (the middle term), which undoubtedly appears as
the immediate cause of the conclusion [Borri, 1627, fls. 56r.–56v.].
As far as material cause is concerned, Borri stated that the mathematician deals with material cause because in
considering the delimited quantity (quantitas terminata), he does not simply state that a certain geometrical figure
or angle is divisible into equal parts, but indeed he draws his conclusions by dividing those geometrical angles and
figures, taking them as the middle term of the mathematical demonstration. By so doing, the mathematician takes those
figures and angles as material causes, that is, as parts of the whole [Borri, 1627, fl. 57r.]. Borri’s reasoning was based
on the authority of Aristotle and on knowledge of Euclidean geometry. To prove that mathematical demonstration
makes use of material causes, Borri considered Proposition 32 of the first book of Euclid’s Elements, according to
which the exterior angle equals the sum of the two interior and opposite angles and the sum of the three interior
angles of the triangle equals two right angles. This example was extensively brought into play in the controversy on
the quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum, being mentioned, for example, by Couto, who takes Proposition I.32 as
a paradigmatic example of the fact that mathematical demonstrations are based on an extrinsic middle term [Couto,
1607, col. 504].
The Euclidean proposition runs as follows. Let ABC be a triangle and let BC be produced to D (see Fig. 2).
Draw a parallel to the straight line AB through the point C, say CE. Because AB is parallel to CE, angles BAC and
ACE are equal to one another and the angle ECD is equal to the interior and opposite angle ABC. Since the angle
ACE is equal to the angle BAC, the exterior angle ACD equals the sum of the two interior and opposite angles BAC
andABC. Hence the sum of the anglesACD andACB is equal to the sum of the three anglesABC, BCA, and CAB .
Since the sum of the angles ACD and ACB is equal to two right angles, the sum of the angles ABC, BCA, and CAB
also equals two right angles. Therefore, in producing one of the sides of the triangle, an exterior angle equal to the
sum of the two opposite angles is obtained, and consequently it can be concluded that the sum of the three interior
angles is equal to the two right angles.
36 Borri uses this example in Borri [1627, fls. 55v.–56r.].
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Borri asserted that mathematical demonstration was based on material cause since the middle term of the demon-
stration shows that the exterior angle is divided into two angles equal to the two interior angles of the triangle by a
line parallel to the opposite side of the triangle, and consequently, taking into account one angle more, the sum of
the three interior angles equals two right angles. By doing so, the geometer goes from the parts to the whole, arguing
that three angles and three right lines are the matter of a triangle. Hence he operates through material cause [Borri,
1627, fl. 57r.]. As far as Couto’s criticism of the extrinsic nature of the Euclidean demonstration’s middle term, Borri
following Biancani in looking beyond Piccolomini’s argument (on which Couto based his position) to claim that the
exterior angles should by no means be taken as an external element. For, as Borri states, “that line produced in the
case of the triangle is not the middle term of the demonstration, but is only taken to prove that middle term, the true
cause of the demonstration” [Borri, 1627, fl. 57v.].
To sum up, according to Borri mathematics fits all the features of scientific syllogism. Mathematical demonstrations
are based upon a priori, immediate, and better-known premises, having the form of proper and essential definitions
and propositions, and make consistent use of formal and material causes. Mathematical demonstration should indeed
be taken as demonstratio potissima and, therefore, mathematics is to be considered as an Aristotelian science.
3. Use of mathematical reasoning in Borri’s cosmological work and its acceptance by Portuguese natural
philosophers
Borri’s discussion of the epistemological status of mathematics was not particularly innovative. His position was
based extensively on Biancani’s De Mathematicarum Natura Dissertatio, though eliminating some Platonic reasoning,
such as Biancani’s conception of the archetypical nature of mathematical ideas existing in the divine and the human
mind.37 However, Borri did accomplish a crucial change in the understanding of the place of mathematics within
an Aristotelian taxonomy of sciences. Having granted applied parts of mathematics such as astronomy the status of
Aristotelian natural philosophy, Borri opened the way to studying cosmology as a mathematician. Moreover, exactly
because he did this within a broad Aristotelian framework, his elevation of mathematics to an Aristotelian scientia
came to play a significant role in the acceptance of Borri’s cosmological work within his contemporary Portuguese
philosophical community.
Since mathematics is successful in establishing knowledge of the essences of things, it should be regarded as a
branch of philosophy alongside natural philosophy. Accordingly, Borri challenged the traditional classification of
sciences and particularly the place of the so-called mixed mathematical sciences in the hierarchy of sciences. In
Aristotelian tradition, mixed or subordinate sciences were conventionally considered as occupying a somewhat inferior
rank in the classification of sciences for the reason that those sciences attempted to explain natural phenomena by
means of the data of a higher science, as astronomy focused on celestial bodies using geometrical principles. They
occupied thus a middle position between pure mathematics and physics. As typical doctrine held that subordinate
sciences were more mathematical than physical, they appeared in poor condition to aspire to scientific knowledge.38
Borri’s perspective was quite different. Having ascribed scientific status to pure mathematics, he was in a position to
take mixed mathematics as part of the true causal science of nature.
37 On the Platonistic motives of Biancani, see especially Galluzzi [1973, pp. 56–65]. A different approach to this subject is given by Dear
[1988, p. 67], who has argued that Biancani’s position on the archetypal nature of mathematical ideas is consistent with “the ordinary scholastic
interpretation of the ‘forms’ of things as corresponding to ‘ideas in the mind of God.’ ”
38 On the place of the mixed mathematical sciences in the broad classification of sciences, see Weisheipl [1965], Mandosio [1994], and particularly
Ariew [1990; 1992, pp. 107–109], who deals with the classification of sciences according to the Jesuits in the late 16th century.
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edge. Clear examples are provided by geometrical propositions. Taking, for example, the above-mentioned proposition
thirty-two of the first book of Euclid’s Elements, the statement that the sum of the three interior angles is equal to two
right angles is evident to every mathematician.39 Nevertheless, this proposition appeared to Borri more than simply
set apart by its certainty. It is a statement of proper and true knowledge, given that geometry draws its conclusions
from the essence of delimited quantities. Mathematical assumptions appeared along with those of natural philosophy
as potential premises upon which an Aristotelian scientific demonstration could be based and from which conclusions
could be deduced.
In arguing for the scientific character of mathematics within a strictly Aristotelian framework, Borri showed him-
self to be a believer in essentialist epistemology. This position distanced him from the novatores who stressed the
mathematical intelligibility of the physical world. This position also moved Borri away from alternative perspectives
on the epistemological dignity of mathematics defended by Jesuits such as Christoph Clavius. Approaching the issue
of the dignity and superiority of mathematics in the Prolegomena to his Euclidis Elementorum Libri XV, Clavius main-
tained that mathematics was superior to natural science because of its subject (quantity abstracted from the physical
world) and its certainty.40 Furthermore, according to Clavius, despite the fact that mathematical reasoning fulfilled
all the syllogistic requisites, in mathematics it is useless to proceed in a syllogistic manner, as mathematical demon-
strations are more direct and immediate than the traditional syllogism.41 Clavius’s philosophy of mathematics is thus
more sympathetic to the Platonic synthesis of Proclus than to the Aristotelian approach, the former having placed
mathematics in an intermediary position between metaphysics and natural science. Nevertheless, Jesuit mathemati-
cians of the post-Clavius generation, such as Giuseppe Biancani and Borri among others, chose not to follow Clavius
in separating Euclidean mathematics (in fact, geometry) from Aristotelian logic.42 On the contrary, Borri discussed
the ontological status of mathematical entities in an Aristotelian manner, stressing the correspondence between logic
and ontology.43 From this point of view, one can hardly relate the Aristotelian position held by Borri (or by Biancani)
on the quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum with the origin of an alternative mathematical philosophy of nature
amongst Jesuits.44
Borri’s promotion of mathematics was grounded in traditional epistemology. His argumentation was directed to
prove that mathematical understanding was based on causal explanation of the demonstrated propositions and, there-
fore, that pure mathematics was to be considered alongside of natural philosophy as an Aristotelian science. In
this context, mixed mathematical sciences, for example astronomy, emerged as true sciences, as both its branches
(“physics” and what is purely mathematical) were recognized as such. Having established the essentialist character
of mathematical knowledge, Borri (and other Jesuit mathematicians of his generation) felt entitled to delve into fields
of research conventionally recognized as belonging to the natural philosopher. Cosmology, a critical subject in early
17th-century science, was one such area. Traditionally, in studying celestial bodies, mathematicians were supposed
to focus merely on the quantity, figure, and dimensions of celestial motions. The reason for this, as Pereira put it,
derived from the fact that the mathematician took only quantitative accidents into account [Pereira, 1576, p. 31].
Knowledge of “celestial physics” was restricted to the natural philosopher, who reflected on the true substance of the
heavens. Nevertheless, since mathematical reasoning was recognized by the Jesuit mathematicians as being capable
of dealing successfully with essences of things, the astronomer’s role could be extended to research and speculation
in “celestial physics.” Borri’s Collecta Astronomica ex Doctrina is a case in point. This book is indeed a mathemati-
cal, philosophical, and theological essay on the physics of the heavens (an Opus sane mathematicum, philosophicum
39 As usual among early modern mathematicians, Borri goes further, asserting that mathematical demonstrations are more certain than those of
natural philosophy, claiming that “if some doubt could be raised on such a matter [the scientific nature of mathematics], it should not concern pure
mathematics, which consists of geometry and arithmetic, but mixed mathematics such as astronomy, music and perspective, because being natural
sciences to some extent they are not as certain as mathematical sciences.” [Borri 1627, fls. 53r–53v.]
40 Clavius [1591, fls. 5r.–5v.] The complete title of this prologue by Clavius to the Elements of Euclid is Prolegomena Mathematicae Disciplinae
cur sic dictae sint.
41 Clavius [1591 p. 20]. This assertion is made in the context of Clavius’s analysis of Euclidean Proposition I.1.
42 The exception among these mathematicians was undoubtedly Christopher Grienberger. See Gorman [2003, pp. 33–38 and 50–51].
43 On the important differences between Jesuit philosophy of mathematics and that of the new physicomathematical science of the 17th century,
see, especially, Baldini [1992, esp. pp. 45–52].
44 Nonetheless, Mancosu [1996, esp. pp. 24–33] has provided extensive evidence of the importance the epistemological debate on the certainty of
mathematics had in 17th-century mathematical practice.
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book is not a mathematical description of celestial bodies and motions, but more accurately a work on cosmological
and mathematical issues. In fact, he addresses problems such as the planetary systems, the nature of celestial bodies
and celestial dynamics, astronomical observations of comets and of heavenly bodies, and trigonometrical methods
such as the parallax technique. In this work, Borri even goes so far as to include a chapter on the creation of the
heavens.
In this context, Borri emerged as a philosopher as well as a mathematician. Some decades later this new sort of
(Jesuit) scientific persona would be identified as the philosophus mathematicus (philosopher-mathematician) by the
Jesuit Mario Bettini (1584–1657). Bettini was a prolific writer and mathematician who was in charge of mathemat-
ical teaching at the University of Parma after Biancani’s death.45 In Bettini’s Aerarium Philosophiae Mathematicae
[Bettini, 1648], the defense of the scientificity of mathematics carried out by Biancani is narrowly followed.46 Ac-
cordingly, both Borri and Bettini shared the same conception of the epistemological status of mathematics and of
the pursuit of the mathematician. In Bettini’s view, the philosophus mathematicus relies on results from pure math-
ematics (and especially from geometry) to carry out the study of the natural world. The advantage of this procedure
resides in its geometrical abstraction. Unlike the philosopher, who considers sensible matter in given spatial and tem-
poral circumstances, the philosopher-geometer abstracts from sensible matter. He is therefore able to examine a large
number of working theories, either possible or impossible (i.e., quadrationis circuli) and with no temporal or spatial
constraints (i.e., representing earth in the center of universe as a point at the center of a circle is not based on concrete
observation) [Bettini, 1648, vol. 1, pp. 18–23]. From this point of view, Bettini states in a somewhat baroque style,
“when philosophizing on the subject of physics, the mathematician-philosopher-geometers (Mathematici Philosophi
Geometrici) have this numerous, illustrious and prolific [geometric] abstraction as an invulnerable protection through
which they securely support, avoid and ridicule the arms of sophisms that the ignorance of so illustrious and remark-
able philosophy [i.e., mathematical philosophy] in vain dares to throw against them” [Bettini, 1648, vol. 1, p. 22].
This conception of the philosophicus mathematicus was exactly what is found in Borri’s Collecta Astronomica ex
Doctrina. Borri, in the manner Bettini would adopt two decades later, made extensive use of geometrical abstraction
and mathematical expertise in his cosmological masterpiece. His research on the physics of celestial bodies used math-
ematical expertise in two ways. First, Borri claims, the true and indemonstrable astronomical principles upon which
cosmology was based were established by means of the competent use of mathematical (astronomical) instruments.
Astronomical observations carried out by experts, among whom Brahe would deserve particular mention, and their
acceptance by the astronomical community, provided astronomical principles with the certainty that allowed them to
be used in philosophical reasoning.47 This kind of methodological approach, as Peter Dear has pointed out, led Jesuit
mathematicians and philosophers to adopt a model of scientific knowledge that was fundamentally “public.” 48
The second method was more specifically concerned with geometry and consisted of the use of diurnal parallax
to estimate the distance of celestial bodies from earth. As Borri pointed out, in order to determine the distance of
celestial bodies or comets by measuring parallax, astronomy uses two principles, (1) that in a right angle triangle it
is possible to determine the length of the sides of the triangle by knowing two of its angles and the length of one of
its sides, and (2) that the triangle under consideration connected three points: the first representing the location of the
observer on earth, the second representing the center of the earth, and a third point representing the location of the
celestial body, the distance of which is unknown [Borri, 1631, p. 105]. An examination of Borri’s parallax technique
would be beyond the scope of the present study. Nevertheless, it is quite noteworthy that he made fundamental use of
geometry in the cosmological debate. In fact, the triangulation method measures the angle of parallax and derives the
other angle using Euclidean Proposition I.32.49 Thus, by observing parallax, measuring angles, and using geometry,
mathematicians could in principle determine the distance to the planets and to other phenomena such as comets and
“new stars.”
45 On Bettini’s biography see Aricò [1996].
46 Biancani’s main arguments are repeated in Bettini’s Prolegomena to Aerarium Philosophiae Mathematicae. Such arguments are that the math-
ematician is concerned only with quantity insofar as it is delimited and that the middle term of the mathematical demonstration consists in a
definition of the property of a mathematical entity. See Bettini [1648, vol. 1, pp. 1–23].
47 The Italian Jesuit clearly emphasises this in Borri [1631, pp. 73–74, 76 and 82–83].
48 Dear [1995, p. 44]. See footnote 51 in this paper.
49 Borri examines the application of Proposition I.32 in Borri [1631, pp. 107–108].
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innovation of those mathematicians such as Borri who integrated mathematics into the Aristotelian taxonomy of
causal sciences was the use of data inferred from mathematical procedures in the context of scholastic philosophical
reasoning, such as the use of parallax data in building up syllogisms.51 By doing so, the mathematician was in a
position to introduce profound changes into the traditional cosmological debate.
Borri was just one among other mathematicians who brought about such changes. Working with astronomical
observations and trigonometrical calculations made by others and himself, Borri adhered to a non-Aristotelian cosmo-
logical model. Among such observations, those of the comets of 1618 deserved special emphasis, as Borri made these
observations while in Vietnam. Furthermore, he was able to compare his observations with those of a leading Jesuit
astronomer who had sighted one of the comets in Macao. This astronomer was Jan Wremann (1583–1621), a Jesuit
from Dalmatia who had studied under Clavius and later taught mathematics in Lisbon, before departing with Borri
for East Asia on missionary work.52 In addition to Wremann’s report, information on the observations and writings
on the first 1618 comet by the Portuguese professor of philosophy Manuel Dias, who observed the comet in Cochin,
reached Borri informing him that both Wremann and Dias agreed with him in concluding that the first comet of 1618
was without a doubt a celestial phenomenon.53 Borri had most probably followed Brahe’s cosmology before 1618.54
Nevertheless, the opportunity of making his own astronomical observation and directly testing his mathematical ex-
pertise could only have strengthened his conviction both of the correctness of the Tychonic cosmological system and
of the probable truth of several cosmological theses that were widely held by early 17th-century Jesuits. These theses
included Roberto Bellarmino’s conception of the fluidity of celestial matter. In considering this subject in his Collecta
Astronomica ex Doctrina, Borri argued for the fluid nature of celestial matter based not only on the fact that Brahe’s
planetary system required Venus and Mercury to temporarily reach the region of the sun, which would be impossible
if the skies were solid [Borri, 1631, p. 163], but also on the observation of the comet’s motion and distance from
Earth. Astronomical measurements and trigonometrical calculations had unquestionably established that cometary
movement took place high above the moon and with a vertical movement. Hard celestial spheres could not therefore
exist, unless comets somehow managed to penetrate celestial orbits or splintered them, which absurdum est [Borri,
1631, p. 162]. Borri’s acknowledgment of the scientific nature of mathematical astronomy played a major role in
his adherence to Brahe’s cosmological ideas, persuading him to write De Nova Mundi Constitutione juxta Systema
Tychonis Brahe aliorumque recentiorum mathematicarum, when he was in India, and once he had arrived in Portugal,
to devote himself to writing the Collecta Astronomica ex Doctrina.
There is plentiful evidence that Portuguese philosophers were widely familiar with Collecta Astronomica. It was
extensively quoted not only by Portuguese Jesuit philosophers and university lecturers of philosophy, but also by
laymen, such as the philosopher and mathematician (and astrologer) António Pais Ferraz (see Carolino [2003, p. 232]).
However, probably more valuable for the fate of Borri’s ideas in Portugal than the later reading of his cosmological
work was the opportunity important future philosophers had to contact Borri directly. These meetings took place
at the Colégio de Santo Antão, sometime between 1627, when Borri returned from Coimbra to read the Aula da
Esfera, having a complete draft of his book on cosmology at hand, and 1630, when he finally left Lisbon. At the time,
50 For a comprehensive study of the changing status of mathematical astronomy in the late 16th and early 17th centuries, see Jardine [1984,
pp. 225–257].
51 Nevertheless, as Peter Dear has claimed, difficulties arose in certain mathematical sciences, such as astronomy, where some data appeared to
be far from evident and thus susceptible of being taken as noncontentious premises—see especially [Dear, 1995, pp. 46–58]. Phenomena such as
the complex movement of planets and the location of comets needed to be established by skilled astronomers in order to turn particular claims of
knowledge into “public and self-evident truths.” For this reason, mathematicians made extensive reference to the expertise of astronomers in order
to support the use of their astronomical observations as premises of scientific knowledge. Borri describes at length in his Collecta Astronomica
the astronomical observations carried out by Brahe and their acceptance by the eminent astronomers of the time, before entering into discussion
of the nature and locations of comets, celestial matter, and motion together with other cosmological issues. See Borri [1631, pp. 75–99, pp. 117
(115)–118].
52 Although Borri [1631, p. 117 (p. 115)] mentioned that Wremann taught mathematics in Coimbra, according to Baldini [2000b, 285], this Jesuit
was responsible for a private course of mathematics at the Lisbon college, in 1614/1615, just before he went to China. Once in Macao, Wremann
resumed the teaching of mathematics at a local Jesuit college. On Wremann see especially Baldini [2000b, pp. 285–286].
53 Borri [1631, pp. 117(115)–116] describes Wremann and Dias’s agreement with him.
54 As was seen in his 1612 philosophical lessons at Milan College. See Borri [1612].
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certitudine mathematicarum.
The Colégio de Santo Antão, as it was established in the capital, was probably the main meeting point for the scien-
tific community in Portugal at that time.55 There, Borri in all probability met the above-mentioned Jesuit astronomer
Wremann, with whom he enrolled on the list of missionaries departing to East Asia from Lisbon in 1615. Also at the
same place 12 years later he met two young Jesuit fellows, Baltazar Teles and Francisco Soares Lusitano, who were
to become Portugal’s most influential philosophers of the 17th century.56 When Borri was appointed to the Colégio
de Santo Antão, in 1627, both Teles and Soares were lecturing there and furthering their academic careers in order to
achieve notice as theologians. During this period, Teles taught Humanities and Rhetoric (1626–1628), while Soares
Lusitano was engaged in teaching Latin (1627–1631) [Vaz, 1991, pp. 658–659]. In the coming years, both would give
a philosophical course at the Coimbran Colégio das Artes.57 At the Lisbon college it was likely that Borri impressed
his two Jesuit fellows, having established a friendly relationship with at least one them, Teles.58 As cosmology was
an issue of mutual interest, it obviously would have featured significantly in their conversations. In keeping with his
advocacy of the scientific nature of mathematics in an Aristotelian framework, Borri showed Portuguese Jesuits the
potentialities of using mathematical reasoning in philosophical investigation.
I believe it is because Borri succeeded in placing mathematics within an Aristotelian taxonomy of sciences that
he was able to make philosophers accept the new cosmological findings. With mathematics being granted the epis-
temological status of science, mathematicians could delve into fields of research traditionally recognized as proper
to the natural philosopher. In fact, as mathematical disciplines came to be conceived not only as a tool that supplied
descriptions but, above all, as something that provided explanations of the natural world, the mathematician’s inves-
tigation was raised to that of the philosopher’s, more precisely to that of the philosophus mathematicus (philosopher-
mathematician). Cases such as Borri in Portugal provide evidence that Jesuit mathematicians embarked on the study
of philosophical subjects, such as cosmology, with a mathematical advantage. Unsurprisingly, those Jesuits dealing
with cosmology would replace the long-established instrumentalist perspective commonly associated with the defense
of the Aristotelian–Ptolemaic cosmological system with a more realistic perspective, according to which they argued
that astronomy did indeed explain how the planetary system really worked. Astronomical observations, philosophical
reflections, and theological speculations led them to generally understand the planetary system according to Tychonic
or semi-Tychonic theories.59
Because Borri performed such a change within an Aristotelian philosophical scheme, his cosmological thought was
soon recognized and accepted by his Portuguese philosopher counterparts. These philosophers could even disagree
with the thesis of the scientific character of pure mathematics in an Aristotelian manner.60 Nevertheless, cosmological
arguments based on mathematical assumptions such as those built up on astronomical observations or trigonometric
calculations could not be ignored. In recognizing mathematics as an Aristotelian scientia, Borri acted as a philosophus
mathematicus and, thereby, he ended up by incorporating mathematical data firmly within the philosophical debate.
55 Early modern Jesuit colleges have been described as influential centers for the scientific community. Because of their educational and scientific
pursuits and their place in an international educational network, they could successfully promote the organized diffusion of new ideas and activities
of people with different skills. Jesuit colleges thereby influenced not only Jesuit personnel but also the local societies of which they were part. See
especially Romano [1997].
56 Francisco Soares was commonly named Soares Lusitanus by his contemporaries in order to distinguish him from his Spanish homonymous
confrere Francisco Suárez.
57 Teles and Soares were responsible for teaching philosophy at this propaedeutical university college from 1630 to 1634 and from 1636 to 1640,
respectively.
58 Examining Borri’s treatment of the motion of celestial bodies, Teles mentioned his earlier friendship with the Italian mathematician in the
following terms: “Ego tamen propter amicitiam, quam aliquando habui cum hoc P. Christophoro [Borri] ab tormento libero eius ingenium respon-
deo. . . .” [Teles, 1642, p. 338]
59 It is not the place here to further examine the acceptance of Tycho Brahe’s cosmological ideas by early 17th-century Jesuits, but doubtless it is
not a coincidental fact that the Jesuits who continued Clavius’s task of promoting the epistemological status of mathematics were exactly the same
as those who first adhered to Brahe’s cosmological system. Lembo, Biancani, and Borri were among them.
60 There is indeed evidence that Biancani and Borri’s essentialist thesis concerning the scientificity of mathematics was not enthusiastically
accepted by 17th-century Portuguese philosophers. In fact, Inácio de Carvalho, for example, maintained that mathematics is not an Aristotelian
science. According to Carvalho, among other arguments, pure mathematicians are not able to demonstrate the properties of their subject by means
of principles and proper definitions, nor to take the essence of quantity into account. See Carvalho [1677, pp. 355–356]. Teles and Soares Lusitano
did not discuss the quaestio de certitudine mathematicarum in their philosophical textbooks.
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Philosophical textbooks by Teles and Soares provide evidence of how profitable that contact with Borri must
have been. Works on mathematical astronomy by Brahe, Biancani, Christoph Scheiner, and Hugo Sempilius, among
others, are quoted at some length and astronomical observations carried out by Brahe, Galileo, and others are often
alluded to in the discussion of philosophical quaestiones. It was Borri who informed Portuguese philosophers of
the most outstanding mathematicians of their time and their works. Nonetheless, more is the success of Teles and
Soares in incorporating mathematical assumptions within a philosophical syllogistic scheme. Mathematical statements
based on trigonometric calculations such as the lack of parallax of new celestial phenomena or on astronomical
observations such as those of sunspots were usually used in cosmological disputes as premises for philosophical
reasoning. If Teles and Soares had not been convinced of the power of mathematics to provide true statements, such
claims of knowledge would not be found in their philosophical thought. Needless to say, their new understanding
of mathematics led them to accept new cosmological ideas, such as celestial corruptibility. Teles, for example, was
of the opinion that celestial matter is corruptible, relying on the premise that change could be found in the heavens.
According to Teles’s Aristotelian reasoning, corruption is part of the process of coming-to-be and passing-away. It
followed unequivocally that there are phenomena that come to be and then pass away in the celestial region (as current
astronomical observations proved, Teles was to add later). The heavens were susceptible to corruption, a fact that went
against Aristotelian principle [Teles, 1642, p. 328 (p. 334)]. Soares simply stated that “indeed, new and unmistakable
observations by modern mathematicians prove heavens to be corruptible” [Soares, 1651, p. 277].
Unsurprisingly, among such astronomical observations, those of comets deserved special attention. The structure
of scholastic textbooks provides room for a particular discussion of this issue (in the section dedicated to the study of
the Meteorologica), and it had also been explored in depth by Borri. A further inspection either of Teles’s and Soares’s
theory of comets or the inspiration they received from Borri will not be presented here. Let us simply concentrate on a
straightforward argument they presented in order to establish the celestial location and nature of these phenomena. In
addition to data of authority on astronomical observations, Teles put forward four arguments, the third of which reads
as follows: “as the supreme region of air is distant roughly twenty leagues from Earth, the comet would not be able to
complete its course above our hemisphere within twelve hours, as mathematicians have truly demonstrated” [Teles,
1642, p. 380]. Some years later, Soares Lusitano expanded this argument slightly by making it plainer. He made use
of a diagram consisting of three concentric circles, with the interior circle representing the Earth, the middle circle
referring to the region of air where traditional Aristotelians used to place comets, and the exterior circle representing
the planetary region (see Fig. 3). Soares proposes the following reasoning: draw two straight lines, AB dividing the
three circles into two equal parts and CD cutting only through the middle circle on its upper side. Let the straight
line AB represent a comet crossing the skies in the celestial region while the straight line CD is a comet passing
through the upper region of air. Since astronomers observed that comets moving with a constant speed took 12 h to
pass over a hemisphere, it would follow that comets could not be located in the supreme region of air. In fact, as it took
12 h to go from C to D, it became obvious that if they maintained the same speed they could not cover the remaining
distance. Only by placing the comets in the celestial region, that is completing the course AB , could an astronomer
divide the circle into two equal parts. Only by being a celestial phenomenon could a comet be observed over a 12-h
period in both northern and southern hemispheres [Soares, 1651, p. 343].
Soares Lusitano therefore proves the celestial nature and location of comets. However, a closer look at the sources
of the Portuguese philosopher (which he did not identify) provides clear evidence of Borri’s influence. In fact, Borri
himself had expounded this very argument in great detail, which the Italian considered to be the universal reason for
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mathematical lessons and philosophical conversations, had not been in vain.
4. Conclusion
Contrary to traditional historiography on the introduction of new astronomical theories into Portugal, Borri was not
the foremost astronomer to appraise Copernicus’s ideas or to stand up for Brahe’s cosmological model, nor was he
even the first to describe astronomical observations by Galileo. Approximately 12 years before his arrival in Lusitanian
lands, those issues were already being discussed at the main Portuguese mathematical training center, the Jesuit
Colégio of Santo Antão. Nonetheless, I argue that he did indeed play a decisive role in the introduction of these new
perspectives. Rejecting the established historiographical understanding of a strict notion of a precursor whose main
function involves the communication of scientific ideas, I argue that Borri laid the epistemological groundwork for
a new approach to cosmology through his advocacy of the scientific nature of mathematics within an Aristotelian
philosophical framework. Challenging the views traditionally endorsed by Jesuit philosophers on the quaestio de
certitudine mathematicarum, Borri stated not only that Euclidean mathematics fits all the main features of Aristotelian
logic, but also that mathematics successfully deals with the essence of its subject (the delimited quantity), therefore
putting the accent on the ontological status of mathematics. Through the epistemological elevation of mathematics to
the rank of Aristotelian scientia, Borri was successful in overcoming the gulf that traditionally separated mathematical
astronomy from the study of the physics of the heavens. Moreover, precisely because he promoted mathematics within
a strict Aristotelian background, revealing to his philosopher colleagues the potential of mathematical assumptions as
premises upon which an Aristotelian scientific demonstration could be based, Borri succeed in placing mathematical
data firmly within philosophical debate. Mathematical knowledge that was derived from astronomical observations,
from trigonometric calculations, or from geometrical diagrams thus emerged as a key element in the Aristotelian
understanding of the natural world. As far as cosmology is concerned, this epistemological change showed how Jesuit
Aristotelian philosophers could embrace a realist perspective toward the study of the cosmos. By focusing on the
metaphysical and epistemological background to the early modern shift in cosmological thought, I am suggesting
that theoretical discussion of the nature and role of mathematics was by no means restricted to the leading figures of
the nova scientia, as is commonly stated. The epistemological revision of mathematics was also carried out by late
Aristotelian philosophers. Undertaken with different purposes, their reevaluation of mathematics led them to achieve
different though significant conclusions concerning the renewal of cosmology that took place in Portugal during the
first half of the 17th century.
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